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 1 
 2 
Across diverse societies, group members benefit from the cooperative maintenance of a 3 
shared territory (a public good). How such public goods are maintained has received 4 
extensive interest, yet individual contributions to cooperative territory defence remain poorly 5 
understood. Recent theory predicts that, in groups with social hierarchies, privileged 6 
individuals will contribute most to competition with rival groups as they benefit most from 7 
defence of the territory. Here, we investigated whether dominant individuals contribute more 8 
to territory defence in a group-territorial bird in which dominants monopolize within-group 9 
reproduction: the white-browed sparrow-weaver, Plocepasser mahali. Using simulated 10 
territorial intrusions, we demonstrate that dominants contributed significantly more than 11 
subordinates to territory defence. We also found that individual contributions were adjusted 12 
according to threat: males of both social classes significantly and similarly increased their 13 
contributions to defence in response to a high threat (playback of an unfamiliar pair’s duet, 14 
rather than that of a neighbouring pair), which was associated with a stronger collective 15 
response by the group. Thus, while dominants contributed most as predicted by the 16 
asymmetry in benefits, subordinates did increase contributions when they were needed most 17 
(in small groups and under greater threat). Contributions by subordinates when needed most 18 
also highlights that dominants could still benefit substantially from tolerating the presence of 19 
subordinates despite their overall lower contributions. Our results show that public goods can 20 
be maintained despite unequal contributions and highlight the potential importance of 21 
context-dependent behavioural flexibility in mitigating collective action problems. 22 
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 27 
In human societies, individual contributions to public goods (a benefit available to all group 28 
members) are often a legal or moral requirement enforced by punishment, yet in animal 29 
societies, evidence of punishment is relatively rare (Arseneau-Robar et al., 2018; Bshary & 30 
Bshary, 2010; Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Heinsohn & Packer, 31 
1995; Johnson, 2005; Raihani, Grutter, & Bshary, 2010; Raihani, Thornton, & Bshary, 2012; 32 
Riehl & Frederickson, 2016; Sigmund, et al., 2010; West & Gardner, 2004). What 33 
mechanism stabilizes cooperative contributions to public goods sufficiently for collective 34 
action (and the resulting public good) to persist despite selection for free riding (cheating) in 35 
animal societies has been much debated (Dugatkin, 1997; Nunn, 2000; Nunn & Lewis, 2001; 36 
Raihani et al., 2012; Riehl & Frederickson, 2016). Olson (1965, page 35) suggested that high-37 
status individuals will contribute the most, while lower status individuals gain benefits 38 
without paying the full cost: ‘the exploitation of the great by the small’. More recently, 39 
theoretical models (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014) have been developed that formalize the 40 
prediction that dominant individuals should contribute more to the maintenance of public 41 
goods while subordinates should be more likely to free-ride, because the dominant 42 
individuals benefit disproportionately more from the maintenance of the public good. Indeed, 43 
in many animal societies socially dominant individuals do stand to reap greater benefits from 44 
the maintenance of public goods, such as a shared territory, as they often breed at 45 
substantially higher rates than their subordinates (Hager & Jones, 2009; Keller & Reeve, 46 
1994). However, the role that social dominance plays in governing individual variation in 47 
contributions to public goods in animal societies has received little empirical attention 48 
(Heinsohn & Packer, 1995; Mares, Young, & Clutton-Brock, 2012; Nunn, 2000).  49 
Group territory defence provides an opportunity for testing theoretical predictions about the 50 
role of  within-group social dominance in determining individual contributions to public 51 
goods (Heinsohn & Packer, 1995; Mares et al., 2011; Mares et al., 2012). Territory defence is 52 
widespread across group-living species, and while all individuals may benefit from 53 
contributing to maintenance of the shared territory (access to resources, safety from predators 54 
and more efficient foraging; Ridley et al., 2008), dominant individuals frequently monopolize 55 
the reproductive opportunities (Hager & Jones, 2009; Keller & Reeve, 1994). Contributions 56 
to territory defence are also likely to entail costs (energy, time), including a risk of harm to 57 
oneself via physical injury or even fatality (Heinsohn & Packer, 1995; Mares et al., 2012; van 58 
Schaik, 1996), leading to the prediction that subordinates should withhold risky contributions 59 
given their lower expected benefits from the maintenance of the public good (Gavrilets & 60 
Fortunato, 2014). Indeed, studies of a number of species have reported dominance-related 61 
differences in contributions to territorial defence, including ring-tailed lemurs, Lemur catta, 62 
and several other primate species (Cords, 2007; Kitchen & Beehner, 2007; Nunn & Deaner, 63 
2012), lions, Panthera leo (Heinsohn & Packer, 1995) and feral domestic dogs, Canis lupus 64 
familiaris (Bonanni, Valsecchi, & Natoli, 2010). Furthermore, individual contributions are 65 
negatively associated with group size in capuchins, Cebus capucinus (Crofoot & Gilby, 2012) 66 
and feral domestic dogs (Bonanni et al., 2010), lending some empirical support to the 67 
prediction that low-rank individuals should be more likely to withhold contributions when in 68 
larger groups (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Olson, 1965). 69 
 70 
It has long been suggested that the cooperative contributions of subordinate group members 71 
to territory defence may have played a role in selection for dominants to tolerate the presence 72 
of subordinates, and hence for group living to evolve (Ekman & Griesser, 2002; Riehl & 73 
Frederickson, 2016; Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick, 1978; potentially acting in concert with other 74 
benefits of grouping; Griesser et al 2017). However, if socially dominant individuals 75 
contribute most heavily to the maintenance of public goods while their subordinates 76 
contribute little, this has the potential to undermine the utility to dominants of tolerating the 77 
presence of subordinates on the territory, given the potential costs of sharing resources 78 
(Ekman & Griesser, 2002; Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick, 1978). One potential mechanism that 79 
could resolve this problem is if subordinate individuals adjust their contributions to territory 80 
defence according to the level of threat to the shared territory, investing more when the threat 81 
is greatest. Few studies have examined whether individual contributions are adjusted 82 
according to the scale of the threat (Heinsohn & Packer, 1995), but evidence that individuals 83 
are more likely to contribute when in smaller groups could be interpreted as investment in 84 
cooperative contributions when they are most needed to defend the shared resource (Bonanni 85 
et al., 2010; Crofoot & Gilby, 2012). 86 
 87 
Here, we investigated the role of social status and the level of threat in governing individual 88 
contributions to territorial defence in cooperatively breeding white-browed sparrow-weavers, 89 
Plocepasser mahali mahali. This species is a year-round territorial, cooperatively breeding 90 
passerine that is common throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Harrison, York, & Young, 2014; 91 
York, Young, & Radford, 2014). They live in groups of 2–12 individuals in which a single 92 
dominant pair monopolize within-group reproduction and subordinates of both sexes 93 
contribute to a range of cooperative activities including territory defence (Collias & Collias, 94 
1978; Harrison, et al., 2013a; Harrison, et al., 2013b; Walker, York, & Young, 2016). Groups 95 
aggressively defend their territory from intrusions by individuals, pairs and neighbouring 96 
groups using duets (the dominant pair) or vocal choruses (typically the dominant pair plus at 97 
least one other group mate) that will then escalate to chasing and physical aggression (Lewis, 98 
1982; Walker, York et al., 2016; Wingfield, Hegner, & Lewis, 1992; York, 2012). Typical 99 
group territorial behaviours exhibited by white-browed sparrow-weavers during interactions 100 
between a resident group and one or more individuals from outside the group include rapid 101 
movement up to a vantage point and gathering in close proximity to other members of the 102 
group, followed by loud duet or chorusing vocalizations by at least two of the assembled 103 
resident group members at any one time (Collias & Collias, 1978; Collias & Collias, 2004). 104 
Previous studies of a more northerly subspecies, P. m. pectoralis, suggest that dominant 105 
individuals may indeed play a larger role in territory defence than their subordinates 106 
(Wingfield et al., 1992; Wingfield & Lewis, 1993), but the cooperative contributions of 107 
subordinates and their context dependence have yet to be investigated directly. 108 
 109 
Specifically, we addressed two main questions: (1) does social status predict individual 110 
contributions to group territory defence in accordance with individual dominance-related 111 
payoffs from contributions (i.e. do dominant individuals contribute more than subordinates) 112 
and (2) when faced with territory intrusions that differ in threat level, do subordinate 113 
individuals positively adjust their contributions (i.e. increase their contributions when the 114 
threat level is higher)? To address this second aim, we exploited variation in intruder threat 115 
level known as the ‘dear-enemy’ effect (Christensen & Radford, 2018; Temeles, 1994). 116 
Territory residents are frequently less responsive to intrusions by neighbouring territory 117 
holders than they are to unfamiliar intruders, a pattern that is thought to arise in part because 118 
unfamiliar intruders represent a greater territory threat to residents than do established 119 
residential neighbours. Based on this, we carried out a paired within-individual repeated 120 
measures playback experiment with two threat level treatments: a ‘low-threat’ neighbouring 121 
pair duet and a high-threat’ non-neighbouring pair duet. We predicted that, given the 122 
differential reproductive payoff of defending their territory, dominant individuals would 123 
show greater individual contributions than subordinates. We also predicted that, while 124 
subordinates would contribute less than dominants, they should increase their cooperative 125 
contributions under simulated intrusion by non-neighbours, which may represent a greater 126 
threat of territory takeover. If subordinates do increase their contributions when they are 127 
needed most, individual subordinates may also be more likely to contribute to the collective 128 
territorial response to intrusions when their group size is small (Crofoot & Gilby, 2012; 129 
Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Olson, 1965), and so we also exploited natural variation in the 130 
size of the focal resident groups in our data to investigate this prediction.  131 
 132 
Methods 133 
General methods 134 
Data were collected between September–October 2012 and March–April 2013 from a colour-135 
ringed population of cooperatively breeding white-browed sparrow-weavers in an area of 136 
approximately 1.5 km2 at Tswalu Kalahari Reserve (27°16'S, 22°25'E), South Africa 137 
(Harrison et al., 2014; York et al., 2014). All birds were fitted with a single metal ring and 138 
three colour rings for individual identification, under SAFRING licence 1444, and were 139 
semihabituated to observation (Walker et al., 2016). The study population forms a single 140 
contiguous block of adjoining territories of 30–40 groups that have been monitored since 141 
2007. Group composition information (number and identity of individuals) was determined 142 
by weekly monitoring observation sessions and targeted captures of the group.  The dominant 143 
bird of each sex was determined by weekly monitoring of dominance-related aggressive, 144 
displacement and reproductive behaviours (Harrison et al., 2013; York, et al., 2016). Adult 145 
males and females can be readily distinguished from about 6 months of age as males have 146 
black beaks while females have paler pinkish beaks (Harrison et al., 2014). Group size was 147 
determined using group composition data from routine weekly monitoring and confirmed at 148 
the time of data collection for each simulated territory intrusion (see below). None of the 149 
groups were actively breeding (laying, incubating, provisioning nestlings) at the time of the 150 
stimulated intrusions or playback trials (based on routine monitoring (Harrison et al., 2014) 151 
and confirmation on the week of the trial). The study comprised two discrete data collection 152 
approaches: in the first we characterized status-related differences in individual contributions 153 
using intrusions by unfamiliar pairs, that is, ‘standardized simulated territorial intrusions’, 154 
and in the second we experimentally manipulated the perceived threat level posed by the 155 
simulated intrusion ‘threat level experiment’ (York, 2019). 156 
Standardized simulated territorial intrusions 157 
Natural intergroup interactions are unpredictable, relatively infrequent and occur rapidly, 158 
making them challenging to study. Therefore, to collect standard data on individual 159 
contributions to territory defence, we performed simulated territorial intrusions (STIs) at 160 
group territories (N = 27) using a portable loudspeaker (Jawbone, Jambox) placed at a height 161 
of 1.5 m on the main sleeping roost tree on the focal group’s territory (to represent a maximal 162 
threat to the resident group), with the speaker oriented in the direction of the foraging social 163 
group. The aim of these STIs was to assess dominance-related differences in individual 164 
contributions to a standard intrusion. The duet of a non-neighbouring pair was broadcast by 165 
triggering a playback track when all members of the group were foraging on the ground 166 
within approximately 10 m of the loudspeaker. Some groups were challenged with an STI 167 
more than once, to obtain some estimates of individual consistency in contributions towards 168 
STIs (see Results). 169 
Playback stimuli 170 
The playback audio tracks were produced using CoolEditPro 2.0 (Syntrillium Software 171 
Corporation, Phoenix, AZ, U.S.A.) from natural duet recordings (N = 13), each given by a 172 
resident dominant pair in response to a standard duet playback (recorded from a dominant 173 
pair in a non-neighbouring group) at a distance of approximately 10 m using a Sennheiser 174 
ME66 directional microphone with a K6 power module (2004 Sennheiser) and a Marantz 175 
PMD660 solid-state recorder (D and M Holdings Inc., Kawasaki, Japan) in 48 kHz, 32-bit 176 
WAV file format. We used playback to collect these recordings to ensure that (1) the duet 177 
stimuli recorded for this study were all produced under a standardized social context, and (2) 178 
all playback stimuli used in this study represent duets given in an interactive context. The 179 
recordings collected from pairs duetting in response to playback as described above were 180 
then used to create the stimulus playback tracks as follows. Each playback track was 3 min 181 
long, consisting of eight repetitions of a natural duet at 20 s intervals (typical production rate 182 
during encounters). Playback tracks were broadcast at an amplitude of 85 dBA (at 1 m), 183 
which is comparable to natural duets which were measured (using a Voltcraft SL100 digital 184 
sound level meter, Voltcraft, Barking, U.K.) at an average of 65 dBA at 10 m (based on the 185 
inverse square law of sound intensity reduction over distance).  186 
 187 
Behavioural responses to STIs 188 
Observational data (168 observations of 122 birds during 39 STIs at 27 social groups) were 189 
dictated and recorded on a DM550 Olympus recorder (ME15 Olympus microphone) by one 190 
observer (J.Y.) during the 3 min simulated intrusion, while continuously observing the social 191 
group using a field scope. In response to simulated intrusion, invariably two or more of the 192 
terrestrially foraging social group moved to an elevated position, close to one another, 193 
became vigilant and began a vocal response. Two response metrics were derived for each 194 
simulated intrusion based on individual behaviours: (1) the identities of the individuals that 195 
contributed to the first response (those that immediately moved to an elevated position, close 196 
to other responding group mates and began a duet or chorus vocal response lasting 2–8 s); (2) 197 
the identities of the individuals that contributed at all during the trial: those that contributed 198 
during the first response plus those individuals that subsequently joined the response (i.e. 199 
moved close to the group members involved in the first response) at any subsequent point 200 
during the remaining 3 min period of the simulated intrusion, as further duets or choruses 201 
were produced by the assembled individuals, but the remaining group mates (if any; 202 
‘noncontributors’) continued to forage on the ground. There were four cases where it was 203 
unknown whether specific individuals contributed during the first response by the group (as 204 
not all group members could be identified confidently due to the dynamic nature of the 205 
response in this large group); therefore, these missing observations did not contribute to the 206 
behavioural response data set (168/172 observations were used in analyses), but these 207 
individual birds were nevertheless present during the STI and therefore contributed to 208 
determining the overall group size for the two individuals confidently identified to be 209 
contributing. Throughout the trials, any acts of intragroup aggression that could be deemed as 210 
‘punishment’ (a bird chased off the territory, displaced from a foraging or perching location, 211 
pecked at, other physical aggression or full fights where one individual pins another 212 
individual to the floor and aggressively pecks the other; Collias & Collias, 1978; Harrison et 213 
al., 2014) were actively searched for in the observations. 214 
 215 
Threat level experiment 216 
We carried out a paired within-individual repeated measures design experiment to investigate 217 
whether individual contributions to territorial defence are adjusted in response to the level of 218 
threat experienced. We focused this experiment on males because our initial results in 219 
response to STIs (see below) highlighted no sex difference in contributions; therefore, it is 220 
reasonable to expect that males’ responses in this experiment would be representative of both 221 
sexes, and logistical constraints meant that it was not feasible to monitor both males and 222 
females. Each focal group contained one or more subordinate males and a dominant male, 223 
and where more than one subordinate male was present, the oldest was selected for focal 224 
observations along with the dominant male. Focal groups were selected based on having a 225 
neighbouring group that was a pair with no subordinates, so that the simulated intrusion of 226 
this pair would be naturalistic, and because an intrusion by an unfamiliar pair represents the 227 
founding or annexing of territory by a pair forming a new group. The size of the focal groups 228 
was three to five individuals, which provided a manageable number of individuals to track 229 
during observations, and increased the probability of our being able to measure contributions 230 
by subordinates (given that the probability of subordinates contributing declines with 231 
increasing group size; Fig. 1). Immediately prior to each experiment, we verified that all 232 
group members were present as expected based on routine monitoring as described above.  233 
 234 
At each focal group (N = 12), a loudspeaker was placed at a height of 1.5 m in a tree at least 235 
20 m from the focal group’s main roost tree, in the direction of a neighbouring group’s 236 
territory and the same position was marked and used for both of the treatments conducted at 237 
each focal group. Playbacks were broadcast by remotely triggering a playback track 10 m 238 
from the group, when all members of the group were foraging on the ground within 239 
approximately 10 m of the loudspeaker. Presentation order of the threat level treatments was 240 
alternated across groups (to balance for order of presentation effects) and the two treatments 241 
were presented on consecutive days (to reduce any influence of changes in within-group 242 
dynamics or environmental conditions), and at the same time of day for a given focal group. 243 
All trials were carried out between 0600 and 1100 hours. 244 
 245 
Playback stimuli 246 
The playback audio tracks for the threat level experiment were all created using recordings 247 
from natural pairs (i.e. ‘dominant’ pairs that lacked subordinate group members). For the 248 
experiment, each focal group that was to receive playbacks was assigned a ‘neighbour’ (low 249 
threat) playback track and a ‘non-neighbour’ (high threat) playback track. The ‘neighbour’ 250 
playback stimuli were recorded from the focal group’s neighbouring pair. The ‘non-251 
neighbour’ playback stimuli were selected for a focal group based on (1) the distance 252 
between the groups (at least three territories away) and (2) ensuring that no focal group 253 
member was likely to have had sustained contact with either individual of the pair from 254 
which the recording was made (based on known periods of group membership in all of the 255 
groups concerned). Playback stimuli were created as described above, except that in this 256 
experiment each stimulus track consisted of the sequence of the first five natural duet phrases 257 
produced by the source pair when responding to an unfamiliar duet playback, to maintain 258 
identifying information in the natural sequence from that pair. Playback stimuli were 259 
broadcast at a standardized amplitude (as above).  260 
 261 
Behavioural responses 262 
Observational data were collected by dictation by two observers (J.Y. and K.W.) during the 263 
playback trial. Each observer followed one predetermined individual male, either the 264 
dominant male or the oldest male subordinate in the group. For a given focal group, the two 265 
observers followed the same individual for both playback treatments, but between focal 266 
groups the observers alternated whether they followed the dominant or the subordinate 267 
individual, to avoid observer bias. The focal males were observed throughout the 3 min trial 268 
and until 8 min had elapsed since the trial was initiated (by which point the majority of 269 
individuals had ceased showing territorial behaviour and returned to foraging). Four response 270 
measures were recorded for each trial. We recorded two measures of individual male 271 
contribution to territory defence: (1) the latency to first movement response by the focal male 272 
(moving up to an elevated position having ceased foraging on the ground, immediately 273 
followed by vocal contributions) and (2) the latency to resume foraging after the onset of the 274 
playback trial. We also recorded two measures of overall group level response to the 275 
territorial intrusion, to confirm the predicted stronger overall response to the higher threat 276 
stimuli: (3) the proportion of the group that contributed to the first chorus by the group and 277 
(4) the duration of the first chorus by the group (where more than three individuals 278 
contributed to the vocal response; Collias & Collias, 2004). If more than half of the 279 
contributions to the first chorus could not be confidently attributed to individual group 280 
members, the trial was abandoned (no data were used from this attempt in the analyses), and 281 
the group was revisited for both treatments a week later. Throughout the trials, we noted any 282 
acts of intragroup aggression that could constitute ‘punishment’ (a bird chased off the 283 
territory, displaced from a foraging or perching location, pecked at, other physical aggression 284 
or full fights where one individual pins another individual to the floor and aggressively pecks 285 
the other; Collias & Collias, 1978; Harrison et al., 2014). 286 
 287 
Statistical analysis 288 
All analyses were conducted in R 3.2.5 (R Development Core Team, 2015). We fitted mixed-289 
effects models (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2014) including all terms of interest (full model). 290 
The significance of each explanatory variable was then determined by testing for the change 291 
in deviance in the fit of the model when that specific term was removed from the full model, 292 
unless otherwise stated below (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). Model assumptions were 293 
checked and, where appropriate, met the assumptions of normality of residuals, and did not 294 
show unacceptable levels of overdispersion, zero inflation and heteroscedasticity unless 295 
otherwise stated (R package ‘DHARMa’; Hartig, 2016). 296 
 297 
<H3>Standardized simulated territorial intrusions 298 
Two generalized linear mixed-effects models (GLMMs) with binomial error (logit-link 299 
function) were used to analyse individual contributions to territory defence in response to 300 
standard STIs. The following terms were specified in both models: social status (subordinate 301 
or dominant), sex (male or female) and group size (total number of birds in the group at that 302 
time) and the status*group size interaction. In model 1, the binary response term was 303 
‘contributed to first response: Yes/No’, and in model 2 the binary response term was 304 
‘contributed at all during trial: Yes/No’. Both models contained multiple observations of 305 
particular individuals and observations of multiple individuals from the same social group, so 306 
‘bird ID’ and ‘social group’ were both fitted as random terms. The random term ‘social 307 
group’ was dropped from both the full models to avoid unreliable effect estimates caused by 308 
model convergence failure when the term was included alongside the fixed effect of ‘group 309 
size’. In both cases, removing this random term caused negligible reduction in explanatory 310 
power (P = 0.99); therefore, exclusion of the term was deemed justified in producing a more 311 
robust model.  312 
 313 
Threat level experiment 314 
Analysing the effects of social status and threat level on individual contributions to territorial 315 
responses required an analytical approach that can cope with censored data (a continuous 316 
response term ‘capped’ at one or both ends of the distribution due to the sampling method). 317 
Specifically, while the two latency variables (latency to first response and latency to return to 318 
foraging) typically contained absolute values below the total observation time, in some cases 319 
the focal event had not occurred by the end of the observation period, necessitating the use of 320 
an analytical approach that can use both the latency information contained in these ‘censored’ 321 
events and the shorter absolute latency values typically obtained. Mixed-effects survival 322 
models (MESM) with Cox proportional hazards (Therneau, 2015; package ‘Coxme’) were 323 
used because they can cope with this type of censored data and random terms can be fitted. 324 
One model was used for each response term ‘latency to first response’ and ‘latency to return 325 
to foraging’. In both cases, the fixed terms were ‘treatment’ (neighbour or non-neighbour 326 
playback stimulus) and ‘social status’ (subordinate or dominant) and the ‘treatment*social 327 
status’ interaction. The random terms ‘bird ID’ and ‘group ID’ were included to account for 328 
repeated measures from the same individuals and social groups. To test for the effects of the 329 
terms ‘social status’ and ‘treatment’, the ‘treatment*social status’ interaction was necessarily 330 
first removed from the full model. 331 
 332 
To analyse group level responses to the two experimental treatments two additional analyses 333 
were performed. A GLMM with a binomial error structure was used to investigate whether 334 
the proportion of group members that responded during the first vocal chorus response to the 335 
playback was predicted by treatment. The response term was the number of birds that did and 336 
the number of birds that did not respond during the first group response, with ‘group ID’ 337 
included as a random term to account for repeated measures. A linear mixed-effects model 338 
(LMM) with normal error distribution was used to investigate whether the duration (s) of the 339 
first vocal chorus produced by the group during the first response to the playback was 340 




Responses to simulated intrusions were qualitatively similar to responses to natural intrusions 345 
or interactions with individuals from other social groups. Typical group territorial behaviours 346 
of white-browed sparrow-weavers during interactions between a resident group and one or 347 
more individuals from outside the group included rapid movement up to a vantage point and 348 
gathering into close proximity to other members of the group, followed by loud duet or 349 
chorusing vocalizations by at least two of the assembled resident group members at any one 350 
time, as previously described (Collias & Collias, 1978; Collias & Collias, 2004; Lewis, 351 
1982).  352 
 353 
Standardized simulated territorial intrusions 354 
Behavioural responses (of 122 individuals) to the simulated territorial intrusions (duets from 355 
non-neighbouring pairs broadcast at 27 social group territories) revealed a marginal 356 
interactive effect between group size and social status on the probability of individual 357 
contributions to the first territorial response (Table 1), and no evidence of a sex difference in 358 
individual contributions (Table 1), when analysed following a full-model approach. Model 359 
predictions show that male and female subordinates in a small group of three were 62% and 360 
69% (respectively) more likely to contribute to first responses than those in a group of eight, 361 
while dominants were highly likely to contribute regardless of group size, and so this is likely 362 
to be a biologically meaningful difference, albeit of statistically borderline significance (Fig. 363 
1). Given the marginally significant P value and the effect size (Table 1, Fig. 1), we interpret 364 
the possible biological importance of the interaction with some caution (Amrhein, Greenland, 365 
& Mcshane, 2019). Of primary interest to our core question, subordinates were significantly 366 
less likely to contribute to the first response than dominants, as predicted (Table 1, Fig. 1). 367 
Looking at the effect of group size on each social class separately, among dominant 368 
individuals the probability of contributing to the first response was unrelated to group size 369 
(χ21 = 0.35, P = 0.56; data set restricted to dominants only; Fig. 1), while among subordinates, 370 
the probability of contributing to the first response decreased with increasing group size (χ21 = 371 
13.48, P <0.001; data set restricted to just subordinates; Fig. 1).  Furthermore, by restricting 372 
the data set to only the first STI at a group, we can rule out the possibility that the results 373 
from the full data set are driven by habituation or carryover effects (status*group size 374 
interaction: χ21 = 8.07, P = 0.005; status: χ21 = 32.2, P < 0.001; group size: χ21 = 7.66, P = 375 
0.005). 376 
 377 
The probability of an individual subsequently contributing at any point during the response to 378 
an STI was not significantly predicted by any of the fitted terms (Table 1), as the majority of 379 
individuals did eventually join the response. In this case, absolute model estimate values 380 
should be treated with some caution, because the model was one-inflated due to 82% of 381 
individuals contributing at some point during the trial. Despite being observed as present with 382 
the group during the trials, 18% of individuals (notably, exclusively subordinates) failed to 383 
contribute at all. A high variance estimate for the random term bird identity in the full model 384 
(365.6 ± 19.12) suggests that individuals were consistent in their responses; for those with 385 
repeated measures during different STI sessions (32 individuals with 2–4 observations per 386 
individual), 81% responded with the same response type (either contributing or not 387 
contributing at all during the session), with only six individual birds showing variation in 388 
response type across separate trials.  389 
 390 
While it is clear that dominant individuals are especially aggressive and will forcefully repel 391 
both conspecifics and heterospecifics from their territory rapidly and with great vigour (York, 392 
n.d. Unpublished raw data) and engage in dominance interactions with subordinates in the 393 
group (Collias & Collias, 1978; Harrison et al., 2014), there was no evidence of immediate 394 
within-group punishment of individuals that did not contribute at all, or contributed less, as 395 
evidenced by a lack of any observed subordinate-directed aggression during the trials. 396 
 397 
Threat level experiment 398 
Data from the paired within-individual repeated measures experiment were analysed to 399 
investigate whether individual contributions are adjusted in response to the level of threat 400 
presented. Focusing on the dominant male and oldest subordinate male in each group, our 401 
analyses revealed that both classes of male responded significantly more rapidly to the high 402 
territorial threat treatment (non-neighbour duet playback) than to the low territorial threat 403 
treatment (neighbour duet playback; Table 2, Fig. 2a, b). Dominant males responded more 404 
rapidly than their subordinate counterparts under both treatments (Table 2, Fig. 2a, b) and 405 
there was no significant interaction between treatment and status (Table 2, Fig. 2a, b), 406 
indicating that both dominants and subordinates similarly ‘stepped up’ their responses under 407 
higher threat, leaving the dominance difference maintained under both scenarios. After the 408 
trial, all males took significantly longer to return to terrestrial foraging behaviour following 409 
the high territorial threat treatment (non-neighbour duet playback) than following the low 410 
territorial threat treatment (neighbour duet playback; Table 2, Fig. 2c, d) and dominant males 411 
took consistently longer than their subordinates (Table 2, Fig. 2c, d). Again, the more 412 
persistent response to the higher threat treatment was due to both dominant and subordinate 413 
males taking a similarly greater amount of time to return to foraging in this context, as no 414 
significant interaction between treatment and status was present (Table 2, Fig. 2c, d). 415 
 416 
Regarding the overall group response to the threat manipulation, a significantly larger 417 
proportion of group members contributed to the first vocal chorus in response to the high-418 
threat treatment than the low-threat treatment (GLMM: χ21 = 16.37, P <0.001; Fig. 3a). 419 
Groups also produced significantly longer vocal choruses during the first response to the 420 
high-threat treatment than during the first response to the low-threat treatment (LMM: χ21 = 421 
11.26, P <0.001; Fig. 3b).   422 
 423 
Discussion 424 
Contributing to competition between rival groups is predicted to occur in a payoff-dependent 425 
manner with dominant individuals contributing most to territory defence, when within-group 426 
social hierarchy determines the nature of individual benefits from defending a territory 427 
(Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014). Our results in white-browed sparrow-weavers support this 428 
prediction, as dominant individuals were significantly more likely than subordinates to 429 
contribute to the first response to simulated territorial intrusions (probably the riskiest phase; 430 
Heinsohn & Packer, 1995), responded with shorter latencies and were slower to return to 431 
foraging following such intrusions. While the majority of group members did eventually join 432 
the collective territorial response to intrusions, a small proportion of subordinate individuals 433 
failed to contribute at all and seemed to do so consistently across repeat trials. The 434 
withholding of contributions by subordinates could call into question the benefits to 435 
dominants of tolerating the presence of subordinates within their territories, which is widely 436 
assumed to play an important role in the evolution of group living (Kingma, et al., 2014). 437 
However, our results also suggest that subordinates increase their contributions when they are 438 
needed most: individual subordinates were more likely to contribute to the first response to a 439 
territorial intrusion when in smaller groups, and subordinates responded faster (and were 440 
slower to return to foraging) when faced with territorial intrusions designed to be indicative 441 
of a higher level of threat. Flexibility in subordinate contributions in relation to the scale of 442 
the threat could thereby help to explain the benefits of tolerating subordinates on the territory, 443 
despite their unequal contributions to defence. 444 
 445 
Public goods theory predicts that ‘privileged’ individuals should contribute more to the 446 
cooperative defence of territory against rivals as they stand to benefit more from effective 447 
territorial defence, since their contributions in territory defence can be viewed as competition 448 
with their dominant counterparts in rival groups (Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014). While the 449 
higher contributions of dominants in our study may well have arisen for precisely this reason, 450 
additional or alternative mechanisms could also be at play. Dominant white-browed sparrow-451 
weavers are likely to gain greater fitness benefits from territorial retention than subordinates, 452 
since they monopolize reproduction (Harrison, York, Cram, Hares, & Young, 2013; Harrison, 453 
York, Cram, & Young., 2013) and may also dominate competition for resources within the 454 
territory. However, as more competitive individuals, dominants could also experience lower 455 
costs of contributing to territorial defence (e.g. arising from a reduced risk of injury should 456 
the interaction escalate to physical aggression) than subordinates, which could also explain 457 
their higher contributions. Indeed, Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014) highlighted that it is the 458 
status-related differences in net payoff from contributions that should lead to ‘privileged’ 459 
individuals contributing more to collective territorial defence, which allows for the possibility 460 
that status-related differences in both benefits and costs could contribute to this pattern. It is 461 
also worth noting that while the use of a shared territory can be considered a public good (as 462 
all group members use the resources therein and hence stand to benefit from its collective 463 
defence), in reality territorial intrusions could threaten some group members’ access to the 464 
public good more than others. For example, in sparrow-weaver societies, while long-term 465 
monitoring of territory boundaries suggests that territorial interactions among groups impact 466 
territory size (and hence potentially affecting all group members, as envisaged in a standard 467 
public goods scenario), such interactions also entail a threat of dominance takeover, in which 468 
extragroup individuals depose and evict resident dominants (Martin-Taylor, 2018). In this 469 
latter scenario, subordinates may be able to remain within the group (and hence continue to 470 
use the public good) while the previous dominant is invariably evicted (Martin-Taylor, 2018). 471 
Such a dominance-related difference in the extent to which outsiders threaten an individual’s 472 
access to the public good (i.e. more so for dominants than subordinates in this case) could 473 
therefore also help to explain the higher contributions of dominants observed in this study. 474 
 475 
Given our results that subordinates do contribute to group territory defence (albeit at lower 476 
levels than dominants) and that dominants monopolize within-group reproduction, what 477 
benefit(s) might subordinates accrue from contributions to defence? As envisaged in public 478 
goods scenarios (see above), subordinates in this and other species are likely to gain direct 479 
fitness benefits from the effective defence of the shared territory, in both the short term (e.g. 480 
via benefits of residing on a familiar territory within the family unit; Ekman & Griesser, 481 
2002) and the longer term (e.g. given their downstream potential to secure a breeding position 482 
within the territory; Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick, 1978; Harrison et al 2014). In cooperatively 483 
breeding species, such as white-browed sparrow-weavers, the vast majority of subordinate 484 
individuals are offspring from previous generations that have not dispersed and hence are 485 
engaging in the cooperative defence of territory alongside related dominants (typically their 486 
parents; Bergmüller et al., 2007; Cockburn, 1998; Hatchwell, 2009; Lukas & Clutton-Brock, 487 
2012). Subordinates within their natal groups may thereby also stand to gain indirect fitness 488 
benefits from defending the territory’s resources (a public good) for use by relatives, and by 489 
defending the dominants themselves (and their future reproductive success) from 490 
displacement by unrelated extragroup individuals (Hatchwell, 2009). Indeed, the indirect 491 
benefits to subordinates of contributions to territorial defence are likely to be an important 492 
source of selection for the maintenance of subordinate contributions to territory defence in 493 
cooperatively breeding societies, in addition to the direct benefits that are typically the focus 494 
of public goods scenarios (Duncan et al., 2019; Gavrilets & Fortunato, 2014; Hatchwell, 495 
2009). While we did not investigate the extent to which individual variation in inclusive 496 
fitness payoffs from investment in territorial defence explains individual variation in 497 
subordinate contributions for our focal species in this study, the lack of a sex difference in the 498 
probability that subordinates inherit the breeding position within their natal groups (Harrison 499 
et al., 2014), coupled with the likely lack of a sex difference between subordinates in the 500 
indirect benefits to be accrued from defence of the natal territory, could explain why we 501 
found no evidence here of a clear sex difference in subordinate contributions to territory 502 
defence.  503 
 504 
Failure to contribute sufficiently to the maintenance of a public good by subordinates could 505 
be met with punishment (Bergmüller et al., 2007; Bshary & Bergmüller, 2008). Indeed, in 506 
some cooperatively breeding societies, subordinates are thought to ‘pay to stay’, a scenario in 507 
which the dominant’s toleration of their presence within the territory is contingent upon their 508 
cooperative contributions, with failure to contribute being punished with aggressive eviction 509 
(Zöttl et al., 2013). However, we found no evidence of immediate overt punishment (via 510 
within-group behavioural aggression) in our study despite variation in subordinate 511 
contributions that could attract punitive aggression by dominants. It is conceivable, however, 512 
that such aggression was delayed and therefore would not have been observed during the 513 
trials. Moreover, the threat of punishment could conceivably have played a role in the 514 
maintenance of cooperation at the levels observed in this study, as individual subordinates 515 
could have maintained their contributions at the level required to avoid eliciting punishment 516 
(Cant & Young 2013). While punishment is a frequently observed mechanism enforcing 517 
cooperation in humans, it is much more rarely observed in animal societies (Raihani et al., 518 
2012; Riehl & Frederickson, 2016). It is possible that, because adaptive cheating in nature is 519 
often at low frequencies in populations due to frequency-dependent selection, or because 520 
uncooperative individuals experience lower fitness (Riehl & Frederickson, 2016), punishment  521 
in the form of using aggression to enforce cooperation need only arise in a very limited set of 522 
circumstances (e.g. in social groups in which relatedness is typically low). 523 
 524 
Some caution is needed in the interpretation of cooperative contributions to any territorial 525 
defence activities that do not involve immediate engagement in fighting with extragroup 526 
individuals, as some resident members could contribute to a movement, vigilance and/or 527 
vocal response not because they intend to contribute to a collective aggressive repulsion of 528 
rival intruders, as is often envisaged in theoretical and empirical studies, but instead because 529 
approaching, assessing or advertising to intruders could offer resident individuals other 530 
benefits (e.g. if intruders constitute potential mates; Thompson & Cant, 2018). This is a 531 
challenge for such studies but needs to be more widely acknowledged. Indeed, this highlights 532 
a possible need for caution in interpretation of the outcomes of our territory ‘threat’ 533 
manipulation experiment in the current study. While unfamiliar non-neighbouring pairs are 534 
likely to pose a greater threat than established neighbours (because of the higher risk of 535 
territory takeover), our finding of stronger territorial responses by both subordinates and 536 
dominants in this context could reflect the possibility that individuals show differential 537 
interest in the unfamiliar birds whose vocalizations are being presented (e.g. as potential 538 
immediate or future mates). However, in our focal species, both within- and between-group 539 
reproduction is monopolized by dominant individuals, and dominant males sing a separate 540 
song repertoire in solo performances in sexual contexts primarily at dawn, which suggests 541 
that reproductive and territorial information exchange are conducted via discrete channels in 542 
this system, making an ‘information-gathering’ function of intergroup encounters less likely 543 
to play the primary role in individual responses to territory intrusions (Collias & Collias, 544 
1978; Collias & Collias, 2004; Voigt, Leitner, & Gahr, 2005; Walker et al., 2016; York, 545 
2012; York et al., 2016). Furthermore, all our data were collected outside the context of 546 
breeding activity for the focal groups; therefore, if any sexually selected benefits of attending 547 
to information during intergroup encounters do exist, these benefits would be of low reward 548 
in the context of this specific study. 549 
 550 
Our findings suggest that subordinates contribute less to territorial defence than dominants, 551 
and that their contributions appear to decrease with increases in their group size. These 552 
findings highlight that while dominants may indeed accrue territorial defence benefits from 553 
tolerating the presence of additional subordinates, these benefits may be more modest than is 554 
generally appreciated as each subordinate contributes less as group size increases. As 555 
selection for helping to rear the offspring of dominants is also frequently thought to arise in 556 
part from direct benefits to helpers resulting from the territorial gains to be accrued from 557 
rearing more group members (the group augmentation hypothesis; Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick, 558 
1978; Kingma et al., 2014), the benefits of helping behaviour that arise through this 559 
mechanism could also be more modest than is generally recognized. However, our findings 560 
do also suggest that subordinates increase their contributions when they are needed most, and 561 
this context dependence might thereby underpin the territorial benefits to be accrued from 562 
additional subordinates, perhaps particularly so when faced with larger opposition groups 563 
(Packer, Scheel, & Pusey, 2002). While all simulated territorial intrusions in this study 564 
involved the playback of duets recorded from a breeding pair (simulating an intruder group 565 
size of two), note that white-browed sparrow-weaver groups range from two to 12 566 
individuals, and larger groups have larger territories and appear to outcompete neighbours for 567 
space (Martin-Taylor, 2018). Consequently, it is possible that subordinates in large groups 568 
(which were unlikely to contribute to the first territorial response in our study, when faced 569 
with a simulated intrusion by a pair; Fig. 1) would increase their contributions when faced 570 
with intrusions by numerically larger opponents, if neighbouring resident groups compete 571 
directly over territory and larger groups reflect a more significant threat to their territory. 572 
Investigating this possibility, and its implications for the patterns of selection that arise from 573 
intergroup conflict, may provide an avenue for future research. 574 
 575 
We do not yet know the extent to which individual contributions to cooperative territory 576 
defence in white-browed sparrow-weavers are individually consistent, although our results do 577 
suggest that they may be consistent under the same context, but express flexibility between 578 
different contexts. Consistent individual differences in subordinate white-browed sparrow-579 
weavers could underlie different classes of ‘contributor’ phenotypes and thereby explain the 580 
presence of individuals that never contributed to group territory defence in the context of 581 
simulated territory intrusions. For example, cooperatively nesting greater ani, Crotophaga 582 
major, appear to have two types of consistent cooperative strategies in the context of 583 
communal nesting: either never cheat (‘pure cooperative’ strategy) or cooperate and cheat 584 
(‘mixed’ strategy), which demonstrates that cooperation and cheating can coexist stably in 585 
the same population via individual tactics (Riehl & Strong, 2019). Similarly, female lions 586 
(Panthero leo) exhibit individual differences in their contributions to group territory defence 587 
(Heinsohn & Packer, 1995) and cooperatively breeding meerkats, Suricata suricatta, and 588 
banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, show consistent individual differences in offspring care 589 
(English, Nakagawa, & Clutton-Brock, 2010; Sanderson et al., 2015). 590 
 591 
In summary, our findings contribute to a wider body of evidence suggesting that dominants 592 
frequently contribute more to territorial defence than subordinates and in so doing are 593 
consistent with, and hence lend support to, the predictions of economic theory that privileged 594 
individuals contribute more. Where subordinates contribute less, our findings suggest that 595 
they may nevertheless step up when needed most, and this plasticity may in part underpin 596 
their continued toleration by dominants. 597 
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Table 1 805 
Individual contributions to simulated territorial intrusions 806 
Response term Explanatory terms Estimate ± SE 
 
χ2 P 
Probability of contributing 
during first response 
(Yes/No) 
 
Status: subordinate 0.34 ± 2.16 40.09 <0.001 
Group size -0.01 ± 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Sex: male -0.40 ± 0.70 0.42 0.517 
Group size*status  -0.85 ± 0.63 3.77 0.052 
(Intercept) 3.22 ± 2.12   
 
Bird ID 2.76 ± 1.66   
 










Group size 1.87 ± 3.10 0.21 0.64 
Sex: male -0.09 ± 1.82 0.003 0.96 
Group size*status -2.30 ± 3.18 1.01 0.31 
(Intercept) 4.12 ± 9.72   




The P value for each term is based on the chi-square test (likelihood ratio test) for change in 808 
deviance when comparing models with or without that term (given the borderline significance 809 
of the Group size*status interaction, we also report the χ2 and P values for the Status and 810 
Group size terms in isolation, following removal of the interaction, to aid interpretation). The 811 
mean estimates ± SE are reported for all terms in the full model. GLMM: generalized linear 812 
mixed-effects model. GLMM estimates are raw values from model (logit-link function). 813 
Variance and SD are reported for the random term Bird ID.814 
Table 2 815 
Dominant and subordinate male responses to experimental manipulation of the scale of the 816 
territory threat 817 
 818 
Response term Explanatory terms Estimate ± SE χ2 P 
Latency to  
first response 
 
Treatment*status 1.06 ± 0.98 1.34 0.25 
Treatment: non-neighbour 2.08 ± 0.60 29.69 <0.001 
Status: subordinate -2.08 ± 0.85 9.96 0.002 
Bird ID <0.001 ± 0.020   
Group 1.78 ± 1.33   
 
 




Treatment*status -0.30 ± 0.66 0.19 0.66 
Treatment: non-neighbour -0.59 ± 0.47 5.45 0.02 
Status: subordinate 1.06 ± 0.47 6.80 0.009 
Bird ID <0.001 ± 0.019   
Group 0.32 ± 0.57   
 819 
The P value for each term is based on the chi-square test (likelihood ratio test) for change in 820 
deviance when comparing models with or without that term. The mean estimates ± SE are 821 
reported for all terms in the full model. Variance and SD are reported for the random terms 822 




Figure 1. Individual contributions to simulated territorial intrusions in relation to social status 827 
and group size. The probability of white-browed sparrow-weaver (dominants: black circles; 828 
subordinates: grey circles) contributions to group territory defence, in relation to group size 829 
(lines show predicted probabilities of responding and grey shading represents 95% 830 
confidence intervals from a GLMM with the variables of group size, social status and their 831 
interaction as fixed effects, and bird identity fitted as a random term).  832 






























Figure 2. Dominant and subordinate male responses to experimental manipulation of the 834 
scale of the territory threat. (a) Paired data (thicker bars represent raw mean) showing latency 835 
to the first response from each dominant (black) and subordinate (grey) male during 836 
simulated intrusion of high threat (non-neighbour duet) or low threat (neighbour duet). (b) 837 
Proportion of focal males (dominants: black; subordinates: grey) yet to show their first 838 
response across the observation period (3 min playback trial followed by 5 min post-playback 839 
observation) displayed for all trials, low-threat playbacks and high-threat playbacks. (c) 840 
Paired data (thicker bars represent raw mean) showing latency to resume foraging for each 841 
dominant (black) and subordinate (grey) male during simulated intrusion of high threat (non-842 
neighbour duet) or low threat (neighbour duet). (d) Proportion of focal males (dominants: 843 
black; subordinates: grey) yet to resume foraging during the observation period displayed for 844 
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 846 
Figure 3. Overall group responses to experimental manipulation of the scale of the territory 847 
threat. Paired contrasts of (a) the proportion of the group contributing to the first vocal chorus 848 
response and (b) vocal chorus duration, under low and high threat. Means are shown as a 849 
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